The Connected Discourses of the Buddha Page 6

  (4) A triad of saṅkhāras is mentioned in connection with the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling: the bodily formation, the verbal formation, and the mental formation (IV 293,7–28). The first is in-and-out breathing (because breath is bound up with the body); the second, thought and examination (because by thinking one formulates the ideas one expresses by speech); the third, perception and feeling (because these things are bound up with the mind). Two of these terms—the bodily formation and the mental formation—are also included in the expanded instructions on mindfulness of breathing (V 311,21–22; 312,4–5).

  (5) The expression padhānasaṅkhārā occurs in the formula for the four iddhipādas, the bases for spiritual power. The text explains it as the four right kinds of striving (V 268,8–19). I render it “volitional formations of striving.” Though, strictly speaking, the expression signifies energy (viriya) and not volition (cetanā), the qualifier shows that these formations occur in an active rather than a passive mode.

  Apart from these main contexts, the word saṅkhāra occurs in several compounds—āyusaṅkhāra (II 266,19; V 262,22–23), jīvitasaṅkhāra (V 152,29–153,2) bhavasaṅkhāra (V 263,2)—which can be understood as different aspects of the life force.

  The past participle connected with saṅkhārā is saṅkhata, which I translate “conditioned.” Unfortunately I could not render the two Pāli words into English in a way that preserves the vital connection between them: “formed” is too specific for saṅkhata, and “conditions” too wide for saṅkhārā (and it also encroaches on the domain of paccaya). If “constructions” had been used for saṅkhārā, saṅkhata would have become “constructed,” which preserves the connection, though at the cost of too stilted a translation. Regrettably, owing to the use of different English words for the pair, a critically important dimension of meaning in the suttas is lost to view. In the Pāli we can clearly see the connection: the saṅkhāras, the active constructive forces instigated by volition, create and shape conditioned reality, especially the conditioned factors classified into the five aggregates and the six internal sense bases; and this conditioned reality itself consists of saṅkhāras in the passive sense, called in the commentaries saṅkhata-saṅkhārā.

  Further, it is not only this connection that is lost to view, but also the connection with Nibbāna. For Nibbāna is the asaṅkhata, the unconditioned, which is called thus precisely because it is neither made by saṅkhāras nor itself a saṅkhāra in either the active or passive sense. So, when the texts are taken up in the Pāli, we arrive at a clear picture in fine focus: the active saṅkhāras generated by volition perpetually create passive saṅkhāras, the saṅkhata dhammas or conditioned phenomena of the five aggregates (and, indirectly, of the objective world); and then, through the practice of the Buddha’s path, the practitioner arrives at the true knowledge of conditioned phenomena, which disables the generation of active saṅkhāras, putting an end to the constructing of conditioned reality and opening up the door to the Deathless, the asaṅkhata, the unconditioned, which is Nibbāna, final liberation from impermanence and suffering.

  NĀMARŪPA

  In MLDB, I also had changed Ven. Ñāṇamoli’s “name-and-form” back to his earlier rendering, “mentality-materiality.” In some respects the latter is doctrinally more accurate, but it is also unwieldly, particularly when translating verse, and thus here I return to “name-and-form.” The compound was of pre-Buddhistic origins and is used in the Upaniṣads to denote the differentiated manifestation of brahman, the nondual reality. For the sages of the Upaniṣads, nāmarūpa is the manifestation of brahman as multiplicity, apprehended by the senses as diversified appearances or forms, and by thought as diversified names or concepts (the assignment of names and concepts being understood as grounded in objective reality rather than as the end-product of a purely subjective process). The Buddha adopted this expression and invested it with a meaning consonant with his own system. Here it becomes the physical and cognitive sides of individual existence. In the expression bahiddhā nāmarūpa, “external name-and-form” (at II 24,2), we seem to find a vestige of the original meaning—the world as distinguished according to its appearances and names—but divested of the monistic implications.

  In the Buddha’s system, rūpa is defined as the four great elements and the form derived from them. Form is both internal to the person (as the body with its senses) and external (as the physical world). The Nikāyas do not explain derived form (upādāya rūpaṃ), but the Abhidhamma analyses it into some twenty-four kinds of secondary material phenomena which include the sensitive substances of the sense faculties and four of the five sense objects (the tactile object is identified with three of the great elements—earth, heat, and air—which each exhibit tangible properties). Though I render nāma as name, this should not be taken too literally. Nāma is the assemblage of mental factors involved in cognition: feeling, perception, volition, contact, and attention (vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phassa, manasikāra; II 3,34–35). These are called “name” because they contribute to the process of cognition by which objects are subsumed under conceptual designations.

  It should be noted that in the Nikāyas, nāmarūpa does not include consciousness (viññāṇa). Consciousness is its condition, and the two are mutually dependent, like two sheaves of reeds leaning one against the other (II 114,17–19). Consciousness can operate only in dependence on a physical body (rūpa) and in conjunction with its constellation of concomitants (nāma); conversely, only when consciousness is present can a compound of material elements function as a sentient body and the mental concomitants participate in cognition. Occasionally the texts speak of the “descent of consciousness” (viññāṇassa avakkanti) serving as a condition for name-and-form (II 91, 14–15); this means that the arrival of the current of consciousness from the past existence into the new one is the necessary condition for the arising of a new psychophysical organism at conception. Sometimes too the texts speak of the descent of name-and-form (nāmarūpassa avakkanti, II 66,12, 90,19, 101,13); this denotes the beginning of sentient life when the current of consciousness, arriving from the previous existence, becomes established under the fresh conditions.

  NIBBĀNA, PARINIBBĀNA

  As is well known, nibbāna literally means the extinction of a fire. In popular works on Buddhism, nibbāna plain and simple is often taken to signify Nibbāna as experienced in life, parinibbāna Nibbāna attained at death. This is a misinterpretation. Long ago E.J. Thomas pointed out (possibly on the basis of a suggestion by E. Kuhn) that the prefix pari- converts a verb from the expression of a state into the expression of the achievement of an action, so that the corresponding noun nibbāna becomes the state of release, parinibbāna the attaining of that state.11 The distinction does not really work very well for the verb, as we find both parinibbāyati and nibbāyati used to designate the act of attaining release, but it appears to be fairly tenable in regard to the nouns. (In verse, however, we do sometimes find nibbāna used to denote the event, for example in the line pajjotass’ eva nibbānaṃ at v. 612c.) Words related to both nibbāna and parinibbāna designate both the attaining of release during life through the experience of full enlightenment, and the attaining of final release from conditioned existence through the breakup of the physical body of death. Thus, for instance, the verb parinibbāyati is commonly used to describe how a bhikkhu achieves release while alive (e.g., at II 82,20; III 54,3; IV 23,8–9, etc.) and also to indicate the passing away of the Buddha or an arahant (e.g., at I 158,23; V 161,25).

  The past participle forms, nibbuta and parinibbuta, are from a different verbal root than the nouns nibbāna and parinibbāna. The former is from nir + vṛ, the latter from nir + vā. The noun appropriate to the participles is nibbuti, which occasionally occurs in the texts as a synonym for nibbāna but with a function that is more evocative (of tranquillity, complete rest, utter peace) than systematic. (It seems no pre
fixed noun parinibbuti is attested to in Pāli.) At an early time the two verb forms were conflated, so that the participle parinibbuta became the standard adjective used to denote one who has undergone parinibbāna. Like the verb, the participle is used in apposition to both the living Buddha or arahant (I 1,21, 187,8) and the deceased one (I 122,13, 158,24). Possibly, however, parinibbuta is used in relation to the living arahant only in verse, while in prose its technical use is confined to one who has expired. In sutta usage, even when the noun parinibbāna denotes the passing away of an arahant (particularly of the Buddha), it does not mean “Nibbāna after death.” It is, rather, the event of passing away undergone by one who has already attained Nibbāna during life.

  The suttas distinguish between two elements of Nibbāna: the Nibbāna element with residue (sa-upādisesa-nibbānadhātu) and the Nibbānaelement without residue (anupādisesanibbānadhātu )—the residue (upādisesa) being the compound of the five aggregates produced by prior craving and kamma (It 38–39). The former is the extinction of lust, hatred, and delusion attained by the arahant while alive; the latter is the remainderless cessation of all conditioned existence that occurs with the arahant’s death. In the commentaries the two elements of Nibbāna are respectively called kilesaparinibbāna, the quenching of defilements at the attainment of arahantship, and khandhaparinibbāna , the quenching of the continuum of aggregates with the arahant’s demise. Though the commentaries treat the two Nibbāna elements and the two kinds of parinibbāna as interchangeable and synonymous, in sutta usage it may be preferable to see the two kinds of parinibbāna as the events which give access to the two corresponding Nibbāna elements. Parinibbāna, then, is the act of quenching; nibbāna, the state of quenchedness.

  To explain the philology of a term is not to settle the question of its interpretation. What exactly is to be made of the various explanations of Nibbāna given in the Nikāyas has been a subject of debate since the early days of Buddhism, with the ground divided between those who regard it as the mere extinction of defilements and cessation of existence and those who understand it as a transcendental (lokuttara) ontological reality. In SN some suttas explain Nibbāna as the destruction of lust, hatred, and delusion, which emphasizes the experiential psychological dimension; elsewhere it is called the unconditioned, which seems to place the stress on ontological transcendence. The Theravāda commentators regard Nibbāna as an unconditioned element. 12 They hold that when Nibbāna is called the destruction of the defilements (of lust, hatred, and delusion, etc.) and the cessation of the five aggregates, this requires interpretation. Nibbāna itself, as an existent, is unborn, unmade, unbecome, unconditioned (see Ud 80–81). It is in dependence on this element (taṃ āgamma), by arriving at it, that there takes place the destruction of the defilements and release from conditioned existence. Nibbāna itself, however, is not reducible to these two events, which are, in their actual occurrence, conditioned events happening in time. On this interpretation, the two Nibbāna elements are seen as stages in the full actualization of the unconditioned Nibbāna, not simply as two discrete events.

  In the present work I leave nibbāna untranslated, for the term is too rich in evocative meaning and too defiant of conceptual specification to be satisfactorily captured by any proposed English equivalent. I translate parinibbāna as “final Nibbāna,” since the noun form usually means the passing away of an arahant (or the Buddha), final release from conditioned existence; sometimes, however, its meaning is ambiguous, as in the statement “the Dhamma [is] taught by the Blessed One for the sake of final Nibbāna without clinging (anupādāparinibbānatthaṃ)” (IV 48,78), which can mean either Nibbāna during life or the full cessation of existence.

  The verb parinibbāyati perhaps could have been incorporated into English with “nibbanize,” which would be truest to the Pāli, but this would be too much at variance with current conventions. Thus when the verb refers to the demise of the Buddha or an arahant, I render it “attains final Nibbāna,” but when it designates the extinguishing of defilements by one who attains enlightenment, I render it simply “attains Nibbāna.” We also find a personal noun form, parinibbāyī, which I render “an attainer of Nibbāna,” as it can be construed in either sense. In prose the past participle parinibbuta, used as a doctrinal term, always occurs with reference to a deceased arahant and so it is translated “has attained final Nibbāna.” In verse, it can take on either meaning; when it describes a living arahant (or the Buddha) I translate it more freely as “fully quenched.” The unprefixed form nibbuta does not always carry the same technical implications as parinibbuta, but can mean simply “peaceful, satisfied, at ease,” without necessarily establishing that the one so described has attained Nibbāna.13 At I 24,11 and II 279,8 it has this implication; at I 236,21 it seems to mean simply peaceful; at III 43, in the compound tadaṅganibbuta, it definitely does not imply Nibbāna, for the point there is that the monk has only approximated to the real attainment of the goal. Cognates of parinibbāna appear in colloquial speech with a nondoctrinal sense; for example, both parinibbāyati and parinibbuta are used to describe the taming of a horse (at MN I 446,8–10). But even here they seem to be used with a “loaded meaning,” since the horse simile is introduced to draw a comparison with a monk who attains arahantship.

  OTHER CHANGES

  In MLDB I rendered vitakka and vicāra respectively as “applied thought” and “sustained thought.” In this translation they become “thought” and “examination.” The latter is surely closer to the actual meaning of vicāra. When vitakka is translated as “thought,” however, a word of caution is necessary. In common usage, vitakka corresponds so closely to our “thought” that no other rendering seems feasible; for example, in kāmavitakka, sensual thought, or its opposite, nekkhammavitakka, thought of renunciation. When, however, vitakka and vicāra occur as constituents of the first jhāna, they do not exercise the function of discursive thinking characteristic of ordinary consciousness. Here, rather, vitakka is the mental factor with the function of applying the mind to the object, and vicāra the factor with the function of examining the object nondiscursively in order to anchor the mind in the object.

  Bhava, in MLDB, was translated “being.” In seeking an alternative, I had first experimented with “becoming,” but when the shortcomings in this choice were pointed out to me I decided to return to “existence,” used in my earlier translations. Bhava, however, is not “existence” in the sense of the most universal ontological category, that which is shared by everything from the dishes in the kitchen sink to the numbers in a mathematical equation. Existence in the latter sense is covered by the verb atthi and the abstract noun atthitā. Bhava is concrete sentient existence in one of the three realms of existence posited by Buddhist cosmology, a span of life beginning with conception and ending in death. In the formula of dependent origination it is understood to mean both (i) the active side of life that produces rebirth into a particular mode of sentient existence, in other words rebirth-producing kamma; and (ii) the mode of sentient existence that results from such activity.

  Sakkāya is a term for the five aggregates as a collective whole (III 159,10–13). The word is derived from sat + kāya, and literally means “the existing body,” the assemblage of existent phenomena that serve as the objective basis of clinging. Most translators render it “personality,” a practice I followed in MLDB (departing from Ven. Ñāṇamoli, who rendered it, too literally in my view, “embodiment”). But since, under the influence of modern psychology, the word “personality” has taken on connotations quite foreign to what is implied by sakkāya, I now translate it as “identity” (a suggestion made to me by Ven. Thanissaro Bhikkhu). Sakkāya-diṭṭhi accordingly becomes “identity view,” the view of a self existing either behind or among the five aggregates.

  Nibbidā, in MLDB, was translated “disenchantment.” However, the word or its cognates is sometimes used in ways which suggest that something str
onger is intended. Hence I now translate the noun as “revulsion” and the corresponding verb nibbindati as “to experience revulsion.” What is intended by this is not a reaction of emotional disgust, accompanied by horror and aversion, but a calm inward turning away from all conditioned existence as comprised in the five aggregates, the six sense bases, and the first noble truth. Revulsion arises from knowledge and vision of things as they really are (yathābhūtañāṇadassana), and naturally leads to dispassion (virāga) and liberation (vimutti; on the sequence, see 12:23).

  NOTES TO GENERAL INTRODUCTION

  1 The Burmese textual tradition of SN, followed by the Pali Text Society edition, counts fifty-six saṃyuttas, but the Sinhalese tradition counts fifty-four. The difference comes about because the Sinhalese tradition treats the Abhisamayasaṃyutta (our 13) as a subchapter of the Nidānasaṃyutta (12), and the Vedanāsaṃyutta (our 36) as a subchapter of the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta (35). Neither of these allocations seems justifiable, as these minor saṃyuttas have no explicit thematic connection with the topics of the larger saṃyuttas into which the Sinhalese tradition has incorporated them.